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the contractor had warranted the sufficiency of the plans to the
sub-contractor. The developer was held likewise to have war-
ranted the plans to the contractor. The court pointed out that
R.S. 9:277114 was not in effect at the time the contract was
formed.
On the basis of the facts before it in Southern Scrap Material
Co. v. Commercial Scrap Materials Corp.,15 the court properly
found that damages sustained by a buyer for breach of a con-
tract to deliver steel should be determined as of the time delivery
was due under a final extension agreement. This is but an ap-
plication of the rule that damages in such a case should be meas-
ured as of the time performance is due. Here the original time
for performance was extended by mutual agreement.
In B. F. Edington Drilling Co. v. Yearwood,16 the court
denied recovery of the contract price for a well-drilling contract
on finding that the plaintiff had committed a substantial breach
of the contract. It refused to pass on the claim made in the brief
on appeal by which plaintiff sought recovery in quantum meruit
for the value of the services rendered on the ground that such
recovery had not been claimed in the alternative.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
In Harvey v. Thomas,' the property sold at foreclosure sale
was subject to a variety of mortgages and other encumbrances,
and the debtor tried to salvage the $4,000 homestead exemption. 2
For some of the claims there was a homestead waiver, and if
these would be paid first, some of the others would be cut out,
and the debtor would get the $4,000 homestead exemption. How-
ever, to do this would disregard the basic rule of ranking among
mortgages8 and the court properly insisted upon their payment
in the order of their priority. Accordingly, some mortgages
without waiver of homestead were paid out of the funds in
14. La. Acts 1958, No. 183.
15. 239 La. 958, 120 So.2d 491 (1960).
16. 239 La. 303, 118 So.2d 419 (1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 239 La. 510, 119 So.2d 446 (1960).
2. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
3. LA. CIVIM CODE art. 3329 (1870).
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excess of the $4,000, so that two lower ranking encumbrances
were paid out of the $4,000 because they were not subject to
the homestead exemption. One was a federal income tax lien
which is unaffected by state laws, 4 and the other was for building
materials (used to repair and improve the homestead) within
the constitutional exception from homestead exemption. 5 The
poor debtor was left with only $768.04 out of the $18,000 fore-




In Succession of Picard,' plaintiff sought to recover the
amount of certain promissory notes executed by the decedent,
and the plea of prescription was overcome by proof of a pledge
which had been given to secure the indebtedness and which
served as a continuing acknowledgment constantly interrupting
the running of time.2 A point of particular interest was the
defendant's contention that the things pledged (other notes and
shares of stock) had no value, some of them having been of no
value even at the time they were pledged. Based upon the con-
clusion that there was a valid pledge, written on the back of
the notes representing the principal indebtedness, the court made
the point that the value or lack of value of the thing pledged
is irrelevant, because it is the pledgee's detention of the thing
which serves as the continuing acknowledgment and because the
pledgee is also under an obligation to return the pledged things
(upon payment of the debt) regardless of their value.
In Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 3 the plaintiff brought suit in
tort against the owner of an automobile for damage (wrongful
death) caused by an employee who was using the car with per-
mission but not in the scope of his employment. However, the
owner's insurer was not joined in the suit until long after the
4. 239 La. 510, 518, 119 So.2d 446, 449 (1960), and authorities cited.
5. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1, par. 2.
6. 239 La. 510, 520, 119 So.2d 446, 449 (1960).
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